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Form and Function in Doing Business Rankings:  
Is Investor Protection in Italy Still So Bad? 
 
 
ABSTRACT: The World Bank’s Doing Business Report (DBR) ranks every year numerous 
jurisdictions across the globe according to their ability to facilitate business activities. Among the 
indexes contributing to the definition of the global competitiveness of the legislations, the 
“Protecting investors index” (PII) measures the protection of minority shareholders in listed 
companies. In this paper, we analyse the DBR’s assessment of the Italian regulatory framework on 
investor protection. We find that the PII falls short of properly evaluating the applicable rules. 
First, it underrates Italy because the DBR evaluation falls short of properly evaluating the role 
performed by independent directors under Italian rules on related party transactions. In particular, 
the DBR fails to properly account for independent directors’ power to veto unfair transactions 
before they are submitted to the board, a safeguard that ensures minority investors’ protection at 
least as well as mandatory abstention by conflicted directors. Second, past DBR overrated the PII, 
so that subsequent reforms that substantially improved investor protection have not been grasped 
by more recent assessments, giving the misleading impression that no relevant changes have 
occurred. Far from representing one of the multiple coding errors reported in the literature, these 
flaws aptly show that the DBR methodology, while correctly attempting to preserve consistency in 
the evaluation of different jurisdictions, adopts an excessively formalistic approach and disregards 
the function of the rules it scrutinizes. In light of the influence that the DBR exerts on national 
policymakers, this approach is detrimental because it might induce window-dressing reforms. 
Moreover, it may rule out experimentation, which is key to ensuring that the applicable rules keep 
pace with the variety of techniques adopted to expropriate minority shareholders. 
 
 
KEYWORDS: Doing Business Report, World Bank, investor protection, related party 
transactions, independent directors, coding, law and finance, comparative corporate governance. 
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1. Introduction 
The Doing Business Report (DBR) is an assessment exercise prepared by 
the World Bank with the aim of comparing the efficiency of nearly 200 
jurisdictions. On a yearly basis, the DBR assesses national regulatory frameworks 
against benchmarks covering various fields of business law; the results of the 
evaluation are reported in a ranking of all concerned jurisdictions. The DBR 
exerts significant influence on the assessed nations. If the rankings display 
unsatisfying results, political pressure in the concerned countries often induces 
governments and legislators to put the inefficiencies highlighted by the exercise 
high on the reform agenda. 
One of the areas the DBR covers is investor protection: the “Protecting 
investors index” (PII) aggregates scores calculated for a number of variables, 
which code the presence (or absence) of rules increasing shareholder protection 
according to the DBR methodology. More precisely, the PII measures how 
jurisdictions protect minority shareholders in listed companies in respect of a 
hypothetical transaction between a listed company and its controlling shareholder.   
The DBR methodology on investor protection has triggered a lively 
academic debate on both theoretical and practical aspects. On the one hand, the 
adequacy of criteria and even the possibility to measure the efficiency of 
legislations have been called into question. On the other, coding mistakes have 
been reported for various jurisdictions. We do not enter here the discussion on the 
merits of benchmarking economic legislation across jurisdictions belonging to 
different legal traditions,1 nor do we scrutinize the appropriateness of the 
variables the PII relies upon. Rather, our limited purpose is to criticize the DBR 
assessment of investor protection in Italy as the outcome of exceedingly 
formalistic evaluations. We also show that previous misunderstandings of the 
relevant laws led to underestimate more recent progresses of the Italian 
legislation, so that that the historical performances reported in the DBR with a 
view to showing the historical evolution of the legal framework give the false 
impression that no advancement was made over the last years.  
Although we concentrate on coding mistakes, our analysis has broader 
implications. Our basic point is that in both the design and the measurement of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Similar benchmarking exercises are performed in the EU, especially in the field of labour and 
social law, under the so-called “Open Method of Coordination”: see e.g. REGENT (2003).  
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variables composing the evaluation grid a functional rather than a formal 
approach should be adopted.2 When the relevant legal regime ensures the same 
result the DBR envisages, although via a different legal device, then the assigned 
score should reflect the equivalent level of investor protection. This may require 
greater flexibility already in the definition of variables. Further, we stress that, 
when assessing the rules applicable to investor protection in any given 
jurisdiction, attention should be paid to the broader national legal framework. The 
outcome of effective investor protection may indeed be better ensured by rules 
that, although not matching the relevant criterion at first sight, bring about 
different effects if considered as part of a broader legal context rather than in 
isolation.3 
After describing the DBR methodology (part 2), the paper summarizes the 
ongoing academic debate on the positive and negative aspects of the DBR 
assessments (part 3). The main provisions of the Italian framework on related 
party transactions (RPTs) are then sketched out (part 4) with a view to 
demonstrating how the DBR evaluation fails to consider that results equivalent to 
those provided for by the DBR criteria are ensured via different regulatory tools 
(part 5). We then analyse more in depth the methodological flaws underlying this 
miscoding so as to demonstrate how a functional approach would help obtain a 
more accurate assessment (part 6). The impact of the miscoding are then 
quantified in order to show how the DBR’s inaccuracies may create perverse 
incentives by reducing countries’ willingness to enact effective legislation and by 
inducing window-dressing reforms (part 7). Part 8 concludes.  
 
2. The Doing Business Report and the measurement of investor 
protection 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 See ARMOUR et al. (2009a), at 586 and 600 (claiming that variables should be selected according 
their functional impact on corporate practices and proposing a set of criteria aimed to match 
functional variables with formal rules). See also SIEMS & DEAKIN (2010), at 124 (comparative law 
is functionalist, while comparative law and finance typically just verifies if one specific legal rule 
does or does not exist in different countries); SIEMS (2005), at 531 and 540 (while statistical 
evaluations typically confine themselves to verifying whether a legal provision exists in a 
jurisdiction, indices should include measures that contain functional equivalents in order to avoid 
distorted outcomes).   
3 See more generally ARRUÑADA (2009), at 571 (noting that “measuring institutions in countries 
with different legal traditions requires appreciating that different legal structures suit different 
contexts”). See also ARMOUR et al. ( 2009a), at 596 (a particular institution, even if suboptimal in 
isolation, should be retained when its removal would exert adverse effects on other 
complementary institutions). 
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Since 2004, the International Finance Corporation – a member of the 
World Bank Group – has been assessing the quality of economic legislations 
across the globe with a view to comparing the relative ease of running a business 
activity in each jurisdiction. Its results are published on a yearly basis in the 
Doing Business Report (DBR), which shows how the assessed countries are 
performing under the common criteria and provides information on their year-to-
year performance, so as to highlight improvements in their respective regulatory 
frameworks. 
The DBR results are reported in a single global index (“Ease of doing 
business”) and in sectorial rankings addressing specific aspects of business 
activity. Among these partial rankings, the “Protecting investors index” (PII) was 
first introduced in 2005 in order to assess how effectively minority shareholders’ 
interests are protected against expropriation via conflict-of-interest transactions. 
The underlying rationale is that economic development is favoured where 
property rights (in this case, investors’ entitlements) are clearly defined ex ante 
and effectively enforced ex post.4 The assumption is hardly questionable,5 
although causation6 (and even correlation7) between the quality of legislation in 
force and financial markets development is still an open issue.  
In order to assess the protection against directors’ misuse of corporate 
assets, the PII aggregates data on the relevant legislation according to a 
standardised set of criteria.8 Relevant provisions in every jurisdiction are 
evaluated and scored under three sub-indexes, respectively measuring disclosure 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 See MÉNARD & DU MARAIS (2008), at 61 (recalling Hernando de Soto’s theory on reduction of 
informality – and consequently of transaction costs – through definition and implementation of 
property rights). On the theoretical framework underlying the DBR see AHLERING & DEAKIN 
(2007), at 869-72; DU MARAIS (2006), at 21-3; PACCES (2011), at 299-300. 
5 See IEG (2008), at 3 (providing a literature review on the connection between the quality of 
business regulatory environment and economic development). 
6 COFFEE (2001), at 59-66 (in many instances, stock market developed before legislation aimed at 
protecting minority shareholders was introduced); CHEFFINS (2010), at 35-40 (UK law 
traditionally offered scant protection to investors, in spite of financial market development).  
7 ARMOUR et al. (2009), at 364-8 (finding no positive correlation between financial market 
development and shareholder protection, and supposing that this might be due to incentives to 
delist in case regulatory burdens become excessive). 
8 Since its first publication in September 2003, the DBR has rested upon methodologies inspired 
by the well-known scientific studies by Andrei Shleifer and his co-authors. See initially IFC 
(2003), at vii. For PII see IFC (2004), at 85 (referring to LA PORTA et al. (1998), where a first set 
of criteria – “anti-director rights index” – was proposed with a view to testing possible correlations 
between the quality of company and securities law, on the one hand, and ownership concentration 
in listed companies, on the other hand; id., at 1150)). See subsequently IFC (2009), at 42, where 
reference is made to DJANKOV et al. (2008) (defining a new and more detailed grid – “self-dealing 
index”). For further details on similar studies underpinning other indices within the DBR see 
DAVIS & KRUSE (2007), at 1101. Reliance on academics or outsourcees in the production of 
indicators is no exception: DAVIS et al. (2012), at 13. 
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required for RPTs (“Extent of disclosure” index), directors’ liability (“Extent of 
director liability” index), and shareholders’ standing to sue (“Ease of shareholder 
suit” index). The PII is the average of the three sub-indexes.  
Variables register, inter alia, what corporate body is entitled to approve the 
transaction, how detailed and extensive is the information available to such a body 
before it makes a decision and subsequently provided to the public at large. 
Enforcement-related features are also taken into account, such as the possibility 
for shareholders representing less than 10% of the outstanding capital to directly 
or derivatively suit as well as directors’ liability for damages and the availability 
of disgorgement of profits. Access to evidence through discovery is part of the set 
of criteria too. 
The variables are measured against a hypothetical transaction, identical for 
all jurisdictions. The involved company – “Buyer,” a manufacturing firm listed on 
the most important stock exchange of the concerned country – purchases a truck 
fleet from another company (“Seller”). Mr James, holding a 60% stake of the 
outstanding capital, is Buyer’s controlling shareholder and a member of the board 
of directors. He also owns 90% of Seller. In the transaction, which falls within the 
scope of Buyer’s ordinary course of business, the fleet value equals 10% of 
Buyer’s assets and its price is set above market value. It is also assumed that all 
the “required approvals” for the transaction are obtained and that disclosure is 
made, so that no fraud has occurred. In this scenario, Buyer incurs damages and 
shareholders decide to sue Mr James and those who are involved in the 
transaction.  
The evaluation team first finds out which rules apply in the various 
jurisdictions to such a transaction. Depending on the availability of the legal 
devices, scores are assigned so as to reflect the assumption that the higher the 
number of regulatory tools for protection against tunneling, the stronger the 
protection for investors.  
 
3. The DBR: Impact on national reform agendas and criticisms  
In line with the declared purpose of stimulating reforms on the assumption 
that an efficient regulatory environment is pivotal in fostering economic growth, 
the influence of the DBR on national policy debates is remarkable.9 On the one 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 IEG (2008) at 44-6 (DBR fosters national debate on legislative reforms, although its role as a 
guide for policy priority is weak because it often focuses only on specialized aspects of larger 
problems and disregards national contexts). See also INDEPENDENT PANEL (2013), at 19 (many 
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hand, some countries have passed legal reforms with the explicit purpose of 
matching the criteria set by the DBR’s evaluation grid.10 On the other hand, 
academics and politicians from other jurisdictions have harshly opposed the 
assessment method and its results, the widespread criticism also testifying to the 
significance of the DBR.11  
The reasons for such significance are manifold. For developing countries, 
lending programs managed by the World Bank may depend on the results of the 
DBR evaluation, which is regarded as a proxy of the aided country’s willingness 
to improve its economic performance to the advantage of citizens’ living 
standards. For developed economies, unsatisfactory rankings exert political 
pressure on governments, given their “name and shame” effect, which is often 
magnified by the extensive press coverage on the DBR.12 Key in this respect is 
that the DBR, as opposed to other evaluation studies measuring national 
performances in different sectors,13 displays the results of benchmarking by 
ordering all the jurisdictions in rankings, thus creating the perception of a 
competition among them.14 Such rankings satisfy the need for easy-to-use 
information15 because they exert great symbolic power and, disregarding the 
technicalities that characterise local legislation, are easy to understand for the 
public at large.16 
While DBR’s echo has been significant since its first publication,17 a 
number of legal academics have harshly questioned its methodology and results. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
institutions refer to the DBR without considering its inherent limitations). See also MICHAELS 
(2009), at 772 (listing the factors making the DBR appealing and assessing DBR’s impact). 
10 See e.g. MCLIESH & ARIZTI (2006), at 110 (reporting how Jordan, Korea, Mozambique, 
Nicaragua, Serbia and Montenegro have used the DBR as a reform driver). 
11 For France see DU MARAIS (2006). 
12 See IEG (2008), at 41 (communication strategy is one of the determinants of DBR’s success but 
may sometimes mislead users, for example with regard to assertions of causations when only 
correlation is demonstrated). 
13 See e.g. CEPEJ (2012) (on the evaluation of domestic judicial systems). 
14 Rankings, as opposed to ratings, may give the impression that no reform is made to the extent 
that numerous jurisdictions are improving at the same time, and may hide the degree of variation 
between countries (IRWIN (2013), at 4-5). See also IEG (2008), at xvi (“changes in a country’s 
ranking depend importantly on where it sits on the distribution; small changes can produce large 
ranking jumps, and vice versa. These factors contribute to anomalies in rankings”); INDEPENDENT 
PANEL (2013), at 2 and 20-2 (which, while suggesting maintenance of country rankings, admits 
that cardinal scores – already provided by the DBR with the “Distance to Frontier” metrics – are 
more informative; for subsequent developments see infra, text accompanying fn. 18 and 29).  
15 SIEMS (2005), at 534 (numerical analysis satisfies the need to reduce complexity in order to 
increase the practical role of comparative law). 
16 See MICHAELS (2011), at 31 (reductionist quality of rankings is an advantage for their 
marketability). 
17 The Doing Business indicators are frequently mentioned among the most important indexing 
exercises: see e.g. DAVIS et al. (2012), at 3.      
8 
	  
Criticisms have addressed both the selection of the standards according to which 
the ease of carrying out an economic activity should be assessed and the process 
for evaluating actual compliance with those standards. Remarks concerning the 
selection of standards often address the very possibility of measuring the 
legislation applicable in different jurisdictions against a single yardstick, thus 
avowedly18 following a “one-size-fits-all” approach.19 What is best – so the 
criticism goes – may instead vary from country to country, depending on the 
legal, political, and social context.20 First, interaction with rules left outside the 
scope of the assessment may limit, and perhaps even revert, the positive effects of 
rules that the DBR methodology considers in isolation. Second, good law on the 
books does not mean good law in action, the latter depending on formal and 
informal enforcement devices. However, the DBR notoriously disregards 
enforcement practices.21 Further, in as much as the set of variables may be 
properly construed, some degree of subjectivity is unavoidable when it comes to 
weighing each of the criteria and, therefore, in determining the final rankings.22  
Doubts are also cast on the ability of one or more specific criteria to 
properly measure the legal environment where entrepreneurs operate. The World 
Bank itself has recognised that the policy implication of its evaluation might have 
been questionable, and has subsequently amended its methodology. This was the 
case with the original labour law indicator. The index measuring the ease of hiring 
and firing workers raised widespread concerns, relying as it did on the assumption 
that less regulation, and therefore fewer burdens on employee dismissal, should be 
regarded as a proxy for higher efficiency. Critics stressed that deregulation does 
not necessarily mean better regulation23 and that there is no evidence that light-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 IFC (2003), at xvi; INDEPENDENT PANEL (2013), at 23; but see also, as regards labour law, id., at 
3 and 28, highlighting a switch towards a more nuanced approach on the “employing workers” 
measurement, for which the DBR has recently provided absolute data instead of rankings. Some 
amendments to the DBR methodology announced in April 2014 will change the approach 
currently followed for the remaining indexes as well. In particular, the DBR will emphasize 
variations in the distance between the results achieved by each country, on the one hand, and the 
performance of the most efficient jurisdiction, on the other hand. This should help point out more 
clearly improvements that, while changing the distance between competitors, are not sufficient to 
ensure a better ranking (IFC (2014a), at 1). 
19 For a review see PACCES (2011), at 303-7. 
20 DAVIS & KRUSE (2007), at 1102-3. ARRUÑADA  (2007), at 734; MÉNARD & DU MARAIS (2008), 
at 77 and 80; INDEPENDENT PANEL (2013), at 3. 
21 See IEG (2008), at xv-xvi and xxiv (DB indicators primarily measure laws and regulations as 
they are written, but the relevance of each indicator depends on actual implementation of the law, 
which DB does not aim to measure). 
22 For a similar consideration with reference to corporate governance indices see BHAGAT et al. 
(2008), at 1825 (market participants may have divergent preferences when weighting governance 
features, and some variables may be substitutes for others). 
23 Every selection of variables inevitably reflects underlying ideological assumptions on the role of 
regulation and its effects on society (DAVIS et al. (2012), at 9). 
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touch labour law improves economic performance or creates more jobs.24 Such 
remarks led to an amendment of the methodology for labour law, now included in 
the new “employing workers” indicator, and to its exclusion from the indexes 
composing the “Ease of doing business”.25 
Other criticisms have addressed the “Ease of starting a business”26 and the 
PII itself, and have consequently involved the global “Ease of doing business” 
indicator because this latter inevitably reflects – or even magnifies – improper 
definitions of sub-indexes.27  Some scholars have proposed assessment criteria for 
shareholder protection alternative to the PII in the attempt to have a more accurate 
grasp of the comparative advantages of different jurisdictions.28 Further changes 
in the DBR methodology, announced in April 2014, will tackle some of these 
critiques with a view to improving the completeness of the exercise and to 
allowing a more careful consideration of its results,29 although the evaluation grid 
will inevitably remain exposed to objections by scholars having different opinions 
on the relative importance attached of different legal rules.  
Irrespective of the theoretical debate, the accuracy of DBR assessments 
has also been challenged, however.30 The exercise relies on imaginary 
transactions – such as the one involving Buyer and Seller, sketched in Part 2 – 
that are devised to test how the law would operate in their respect.31 Data on the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 See e.g. BERG & CAZES (2008), at 350 and 355-60.  
25 See BAKVIS  (2009), at 434; IFC (2013a), at 2. 
26 See ARRUÑADA (2007) (DBR methodology, which assigns a better score to jurisdictions where 
procedural requirements such as preregistration and registration are cheaper and less time-
consuming, underestimates the costs of reduced legal certainty); for a reply, see DJANKOV (2008). 
See also ARRUÑADA (2009) for a counter-reply. 
27 See INDEPENDENT PANEL (2013), at 4 (noting that there is no strong justification for simple 
averaging across indicators to produce the Ease of doing business index and suggesting its 
removal). 
28 An alternative shareholder protection index is proposed by LELE & SIEMS (2007). On the same 
index see also SIEMS & DEAKIN (2010), at 128-35; CENTRE FOR BUSINESS RESEARCH (2009).  
29 The PII will be renamed “protecting minority investors” index and will cover an extended set of 
rules. For instance, attention will be paid to shareholders rights, including pre-emption on newly-
issue shares and the presence of a mandatory bid rule, as well as to rules concerning decisions that 
have to be submitted to the general meeting, such as issuance of new shares. Furthermore, the 
assessment will address the composition of the board of directors as regards the presence of non-
executive or independent members and the separation of the chairperson and the CEO (IFC 
(2014a), at 3; IFC (2014b).  
30 See e.g. DAVIS & KRUSE (2007), at 1104-7, 1111, and 1115 (concluding that shortcomings in 
the DBR assessments make the report too unsound to be used as the basis for across-the-board 
legal reforms). 
31 This approach has also been criticized by some scholars, in whose opinion the selection of a 
hypothetical scenario by economists from the US is very likely to reflect the specific 
characteristics of common law jurisdictions, thus biasing the subsequent comparison with civil law 
jurisdictions (MICHAELS (2009), at 786). See also SIEMS & DEAKIN (2010), cit., at 125 (as the Law 
and Finance stream of research is mainly based on US securities law, it can be regarded as a 
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rules applicable to such hypothetical scenarios are gathered through 
questionnaires submitted to local experts and subsequently discussed with the 
World Bank team in charge of the evaluation.32 That procedure has not always 
proved reliable.33 For instance, Italy’s PII score was also affected by mistakes that 
the DBR itself has later recognized as such.34 
 
4. The Italian Framework on related party transactions 
The Regulation on Related Party Transactions (hereinafter, “the RPT 
Regulation” or “the Regulation”) sets out the rules and principles Italian listed 
companies have to comply with in order to ensure that transactions with related 
parties are adequately disclosed to the market and fulfil minimum standards of 
substantial and procedural fairness.35 The Regulation, approved by Consob – the 
Italian Securities and Exchange Commission – in 2010 and fully enacted in 2011, 
contains a set of detailed rules, but it leaves room for some optional choices.36 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
“hidden benchmarking” which measures the vicinity to the US model); INDEPENDENT PANEL 
(2013), 16 (the selection of the hypothetical scenarios used to test the variables may be prone to 
home biases). DBR criteria’s appropriateness was however questioned from a US perspective as 
well (PACCES (2011), at 303). 
32 For a description see IEG (2008), at 13-9; DAVIS & KRUSE (2007), at 1099-100.  
33 Numerous mistakes afflicting the first DBR on France were pointed out in the fracas raised by 
the French legal and political community (see fn. 11; see also DU MARAIS (2006), at 45 (binary 
codes do not fit with instances where more than two options are available under national law)) and 
were therefore fixed in the subsequent editions (KERHUEL & FAUVARQUE-COSSON (2009), at 815-
6). Mistakes affecting other countries in the measurement of the “Ease of starting a business” 
index are reported by ARRUÑADA (2007), at 743-4, and ARRUÑADA (2009), at 559. See also 
HØYLAND et al. (2012), at 8 (measuring the uncertainty affecting DBR evaluations). Mistakes 
have similarly been highlighted in LA PORTA et al. (1998) (see supra, fn. 8): see SPAMANN (2010) 
(finding that data reported for 33 out of the 46 surveyed countries were affected by coding errors, 
the correction of which  falsifies the claim of the original study that common law outperforms civil 
law in terms of investor protection). 
34 The “Ease of shareholder suits” index includes a variable that measures the level of proof 
required for civil lawsuits. If this is lower than the burden of proof applicable to criminal cases, 
then the jurisdiction gets one point. Up to the 2012 Report, the variable scored 0 (see the Country 
Table for Italy as of 2012). However, the correct indicator should have been 1 because under 
Italy’s rules criminal liability requires proof of intentionality while civil liability is based on 
negligence, which is easier to prove. The mistake was fixed as from the 2013 report. As that 
variation did not reflect any law reform, the 2013 and 2014 Reports properly report no change 
over time in this respect (see IFC (2014c), at 60). The same holds true for other rankings, which 
were consequently amended in retrospect (id., at 57). Similar retroactive corrections are not 
exceptional: see IEG (2008), at 17. See also DU MARAIS (2006), at 40 and 54 (questions on the 
standard of evidence in the PII are framed according to common law legal tradition and might 
make little sense for civil law countries, thus leading to coding errors).  
35 See Art. 2 RPT Regulation (Consob Decision No. 17221 of 12 March 2010, as amended; O.J. 
No. 152 of 2 July 2010). We provide here an overview of the rules applicable to Buyer’s 
transaction with Mr. James. For a more comprehensive description of the Regulation see BIANCHI 
et al. (2010), at 10-13; OECD (2012), at 115-6. 
36 See BIANCHI et al. (2010), at 13 (identifying the most relevant optional provisions). 
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Because the DBR only considers default provisions for its exercise, with few 
exceptions we limit our description to rules applying to the PII hypothetical 
transaction by default. 
The Regulation prescribes that the board as a whole shall be in charge of 
deciding whether the RPT is to be entered into, so that no delegation of powers to 
the executives is allowed in this respect.37 Before such a decision is made, 
however, a special committee – composed exclusively of unrelated38 
independent39 directors – shall evaluate the substantial fairness of the affair as 
well as the company’s interest in entering into the transaction. The special 
committee has to be involved in the negotiations and internal decision-making 
process leading to the RPT approval. Not only is it entitled to receive timely 
information on the ongoing negotiations, but it may also request clarifications on 
specific issues and provide comments to the executives throughout the process.40 
The committee may also ask for the advice of independent experts of its own 
choice, the company bearing the related costs.41 
The special committee has a veto power over the transaction, in the form 
of a binding advice thereon. Alternatively, an express charter provision may opt 
out of the special committee voting requirement in favour of a double-majority 
quorum for board approval, so that the transaction may not be entered into unless 
the majority of the independent board members have approved it.42 The 
Regulation,43 however, allows companies to overcome the independent directors’ 
binding negative advice – under the form of either a committee resolution or a 
double-majority quorum – through an ad hoc authorization by the shareholders’ 
general meeting.44 When the company opts for this opportunity, the applicable 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37	  Art. 8(1)(a), RPT Regulation. 
38 For the purposes of the Regulation, directors are “unrelated” if they are neither the counterpart 
of the relevant transaction nor a related party thereof. 
39 Directors are deemed independent if they comply with the requirements set by the applicable 
corporate governance code. If the company does not conform to any code, then some default 
requirements apply (Art. 3(1)(h), RPT Regulation).  
40 Art. 8(1)(b), RPT Regulation. Early involvement of independent directors enhances the quality 
of their review and improves the general rule requiring disclosure of conflicts of interests to the 
whole board when the final decision on the transaction is taken (art. 2391 Civil Code). The 
procedure therefore goes beyond the DBR methodology, where compliance with the general rule 
suffices to receive the maximum score (2) for the variable “whether disclosure of the conflict of 
interest by Mr James to the board of directors is required” (one point is given if a general 
disclosure that a conflict exists is mandated without any further specification, and no point 
otherwise). 
41 Companies may cap the total expenses for opinions concerning transactions of lesser 
importance. 
42 Art. 8(1)(c), RPT Regulation. 
43 Art. 8(2), RPT Regulation.  
44 In April 2014, the EU Commission adopted a proposal to introduce an EU-wide legislation on 
related party transactions. According to the proposal, shareholder approval shall be mandated 
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procedures shall ensure that the proposed transaction can only be entered into if, 
besides reaching the ordinary quorum, it is approved by a majority of unrelated 
shareholders (so-called “whitewash” procedure),45 so that the transaction cannot 
be entered into if the majority of minority has voted against the transaction.46  
When it comes to disclosure, specific provisions in the Regulation add on 
the general rules on ad hoc dissemination of inside information47 by requiring that 
information be given, inter alia, on the qualification of the transaction as RPT, on 
the nature of the relationship with the related party (to be identified), on the 
amount of the transaction, on the procedure followed for approval, and on 
dissenting opinions – if any – within the board or the special committee48.  
Irrespective of the qualification of the RPT as inside information, detailed 
information must be published within seven days of approval by the competent 
body of the transaction or, as the case may be, of the contractual proposal.49 Such 
information is provided in accordance with a standardised format set by the 
Regulation that mandates disclosure of the terms of the transaction – including, 
inter alia, specification of the company’s interest in the operation and description 
of the criteria adopted to define the consideration paid – and of the conflicting 
interests, including indirect interests, such as in the case where managers’ 
compensation is influenced by the performance of the RPT.50  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
before any such transaction is entered into which exceeds 5% of company’s assets or which can 
have a significant impact on profits or turnover (see EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2014), at 9). 
45 Art. 11(3), RPT Regulation. Companies’ code and bylaws are allowed to establish that a 
minimum threshold, not higher than 10%, must be present at the GM in order to make the 
whitewash effective. 
46 The majority of the minority approval mechanism neutralizes the effects of the provision failing 
to impose abstention from voting on conflicted shareholders (Art. 2373 Civil Code). 
47 According to Art. 114 and 181 of the Consolidated Law on Finance, enacting Art. 6 of directive 
2003/6/EC, companies shall immediately disclose inside information concerning transactions that, 
if made public, would be likely to have a significant effect on the price of their shares. In the 
DBR’s methodology, no reference is made to how the transaction relates to ad hoc disclosure 
duties, possibly also because no such duties exist under US law. Any evaluation on whether such a 
transaction involves price sensitive information will be highly discretional, although the size of the 
consideration paid for the truck fleet is very likely to make dissemination necessary. Because the 
DBR treats Germany as a jurisdiction imposing immediate, detailed disclosure of Mr. James’s 
transaction (see IFC (2014d), at 64, where a scoring of 1 is assigned because the applicable rules 
require disclosure of the transaction, but not of Mr. James’s interest), and such a conclusion can 
only be based on the ad hoc disclosure duties deriving from EU law (in the absence of specific 
disclosure duties relating to RPTs under German law), we will similarly assume in the following 
that Mr. James’s transaction would trigger ad hoc disclosure duties in Italy as well.    
48 Art. 6 RPT Regulation; see also Art. 6(7) directive 2003/6/EC. 
49 The questionnaire used to gather the relevant data only refers to information disseminated within 
72 hours after the transaction is approved (IFC (2013b), at 5).	  
50 See Art. 5 and Annex 4, RPT Regulation. 
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Finally, annual and interim reports must provide information on individual 
major RPTs.51 
 
5. Measuring investor protection in Italy after the Regulation  
According to the 2014 DBR, Italy does not reach the highest score in a 
number of sub-indexes (10 out of 18) within the PII. Furthermore, the DBR does 
not report, in its section displaying historical performances, any variation in the 
applicable rules during the last years. Neither approval of the RPT Regulation (in 
2010) nor its entry into force (in 2011) are coded as relevant regulatory reforms 
for investor protection. Most of the scorings assigned adequately reflect Italy’s 
current and previous legal and regulatory environment, while others do not. 
Coding mistakes may affect the assessment of a jurisdiction either because 
they under- or overestimate the current level of investor protection or because 
they misrepresent the evolution of the applicable rules, as is the case, for instance, 
when past overrated scorings hamper the registration of subsequent 
improvements. The reasons why some of the scores assigned to Italy inaccurately 
reflect the national legal framework, either for the present or for the past, are 
manifold. In some cases, the scoring may simply be the result of a basic 
misunderstanding of the Italian legislation; in others, miscoding may stem from a 
formalistic interpretation – rather than a functional one – of either the applicable 
rules or the DB methodology itself. As a result, according to the DBRs, the Italian 
legal system has made no progress in recent years, and, correspondingly, no 
noteworthy reform is reported to have been passed in 2010 or enacted in 2011.52 
As we show below, these results fail to account for Italy’s improved legal regime 
following enactment of the RPT Regulation,53 in spite of DBR team’s statement 
that “a rigorous reform effort will certainly be reflected in the DB indicators,”54 
irrespective of whether it is intended to improve on DBR rankings.  
We analyse mistakes that affected past assessments, hence providing 
wrong information on the jurisdiction’s development, in part 7. In this part, we 
highlight one inaccuracy that miscodes the legislation in force. In particular, the 
DBR is flawed in that it fails to properly account for the function performed by 
the review of RPTs by independent directors and the ensuing veto power over 
unfair deals. We believe that the enhanced role of independent board members 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Art. 5, RPT Regulation. 
52 IFC (2012a), at 61-3. See also Figure 1 below.  
53 See OECD (2012), at 117 (“Italy has made considerable progress in recent years to promote and 
defend shareholder rights and to improve transparency”).	  
54 IFC (2012b), at 3. 
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brought substantial change to Italian corporate practices: there is evidence that 
active shareholders can take advantage of the Regulation to successfully challenge 
RPTs,55 showing that the new legal devices aimed to protect minorities are not 
just cosmetic. 
While we acknowledge that one mistake is tolerable in assessing a 
country’s legal protections for minority shareholders, we focus on it for three 
main reasons. First, its impact on Italy’s PII ranking is not negligible, as it 
accounts for 18 positions in the last DBR.56 Second, it affects one of the core 
regulatory devices the RPT Regulation relies upon in ensuring that conflicted 
transactions are entered into at fair conditions; the DBR’s misunderstanding of the 
Italian jurisdiction is therefore much larger than showed by the skewed ranking. 
Third, this coding mistake is revealing of the challenges the DBR exercise faces 
in balancing objectivity, on the one hand, and the need to meaningfully account 
for peculiar solutions by individual jurisdictions, on the other hand. 
Indeed, some of the procedural requirements in the RPT Regulation are 
admittedly rather unique, so that it may be difficult to precisely fit them within the 
strictures of the inevitably standardized model legal framework that the DBR 
exercise is implicitly based on. 
That is the case with the special committee’s binding advice on the RPT. 
The PII variable at stake is the one relating to the corporate body providing 
legally sufficient approval for the transaction. The evaluation grid assigns a score 
of zero if the CEO alone can approve the RPT; one point is given if the board of 
directors or shareholders must vote but Mr James is permitted to vote in his 
quality of board member or shareholder respectively; a score of two is assigned if 
the board approval is needed and Mr James is not permitted to vote; finally, a 
maximum score of three is granted if shareholders must vote on the transaction 
and Mr James must abstain.   
According to the DB team in charge of evaluating Italy, “[RPTs] are pre-
approved by the independent directors’ committee and approved by the board of 
directors. In addition, the new regulation allows the participation of the interested 
party in the approval process (board of directors). In addition, according to the 
new regulations, regardless of the committee’s opinion, the board of directors (in 
which the interested party can vote) has the final say on the transaction. It is 
important to note that according to the new regulations, the committee of 
independent directors does not have the power to block or veto related-party 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 See BELCREDI & ENRIQUES  (2014), at 27-8 (reporting successful initiatives by Amber Capital 
LP at companies such as Fondiaria SAI and Parmalat).  
56 See Table 6 below. 
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transactions. Based on the methodology, Italy receives one point under this 
questions.”57 Hence, a score of 1 is assigned to Italy in this regard. 
The reported statement is inaccurate in describing the RPT Regulation and 
shows some misunderstandings on the functioning of its procedural safeguards. 
As clarified in part 4, the new regulation relies on the review of RPTs by a special 
committee of independent directors and their veto power thereon as the primary 
tool for ensuring minority shareholder protection.  
More precisely, independent directors are involved in the negotiation and 
the board of directors approves the RPT subject to a binding favourable advice 
from a committee of independent directors. In other words, the committee of 
independent directors does have a veto power on RPTs like Buyer’s.58  
The requirement for independent committee’s binding opinion neutralizes 
the disgraceful choice by Italian lawmakers in 2003 not to disqualify interested 
directors from voting.59 It does so, because interested directors cannot be pivotal, 
as they cannot be members of the special committee holding the veto power.60 
To conclude, under the default regime, a negative advice from the 
independent directors committee does block the RPT. In such a default situation, 
therefore, the appropriate score should be 2, instead of 1 (the score assigned to 
Italy in this regard).61 As the coding we would deem appropriate at first sight does 
not correspond to that displayed by the DBR, in the next part we analyse more in 
depth the reasoning underpinning the DBR judgement and provide a critique 
thereto.  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 See DBR TEAM (2011a), at 13. 
58 The committee’s binding advice is the default rule, but a double-majority quorum is required for 
opting-out companies (see text accompanying fn. 42).	  
59 Art. 2391, Civil Code (It.). To be sure, if the majority is reached and the interested director’s 
vote is pivotal, the board resolution (as well as the RPT) is voidable in case it is harmful for the 
company. 
60 Nor can they count for independent directors’ majority purposes in case companies have opted 
out of the default rule providing for the special committee’s veto power. See supra note 58.	  
61 To be sure, companies may opt out of the said regime via a charter amendment (to be approved 
by shareholders holding a two thirds majority of the capital represented at the meeting, according 
to the general rule: Articles 2368 and 2369 Civil Code), so that the independent committee does 
not have the final say on the RPT; but, whenever companies opt out this way, the power to 
approve the RPT is shifted to the general meeting upon the favourable vote of non-interested 
shareholders. If the optional regime is chosen, therefore, 3 should be the correct score. We leave 
this hypothesis out of the picture in the following, because the DBR focuses on default rules. If the 
pending EU Commission’s proposal mandating shareholder approval is eventually to become law 
(see supra, fn. 44), Italy – as any other EU jurisdiction – will get 3 points for this variable.    
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6. The DBR evaluation. Methodological issues 
The DB team’s explanations62 show that the reason why the DBR assigns 
1 to Italy in spite of the independent directors’ veto power is twofold: 
1. The committee approval is regarded as an obtained “required approval” 
under the case study assumptions (see part 2). Hence, the independent 
committee does not have the final say on the RPT because, in case of a 
positive opinion (which is assumed), the approval is left to the board as a 
whole. 
2. Interested parties may vote when they are called to participate in the final 
board approval. 
Both points are formally correct, but none of them really grasps the 
regulatory mechanism underlying the Italian rules on RPTs. Suffice it to say that, 
according to the methodology as applied by the team, no difference would exist 
between the current Italian regime and one where the RPT is approved by the 
board with an ordinary voting procedure giving no special role to its independent 
members. That is misleading because the two mechanisms – ordinary voting 
procedure and independent committee’s veto – are unlikely to lead to the same 
outcome. Of course, clear-cut categorizations always bear the risk that regulations 
like the Italian one – which is admittedly peculiar – do not perfectly match with 
any of the classifications provided by the methodology. However, approaching 
law from a functional perspective would seem to be more sensible than engaging 
in a box-ticking exercise.  
As regards the first statement above (the independent committee does not 
have the final say), what matters from a functional point of view is who bears the 
final responsibility to screen the RPTs, rather than who has the final say on their 
positive approval. The two functions are usually commingled because, by casting 
a single vote, directors may either approve or reject the proposal, and DB’s 
methodology is consequently based on such a common voting pattern. On the 
contrary, the procedure set forth by the RPT Regulation somehow splits the two 
phases so that once a negative vote is expressed by the committee of independent 
directors, voting by the board is ruled out. In other words, for investor protection 
purposes, it is indeed relevant whether someone else than Mr James and the board 
as a whole can say “no” to the transaction. The fact that the whole board (together 
with Mr James) may still decide whether to approve the transaction and act as a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 DBR TEAM (2011b), at 2.  
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second, and yet, unlikely and ineffective, screen is irrelevant, because the 
proposed transaction has already been deemed fair and useful by a subset of 
independent and disinterested directors alone. Hence, the evaluation grid – or, 
rather, its application – improperly assume that only mandatory abstention may 
avoid improper influence by interested parties on the decision to be taken. Hence, 
the methodology regards any regulatory device deviating from this standard as 
inadequate, even if it actually delivers results that are (at least) equally effective.63 
In Italy, the whole board maintains the power to vote down the RPT, but if 
and only if the committee of independent directors has given its approval. Since 
committee approval is a governance device that is specifically intended to ensure 
independent evaluation of the RPT’s fairness in the light of the company’s 
interest, regarding it as any other preliminary authorization  prevents the 
assessment exercise from taking into account any regulatory strategy other than 
full board voting and therefore clearly runs counter to the principle, which is self-
evident in comparative law, that the same normative effect can be achieved by 
different means.64 To the extent that independent director approval is required in 
order for a resolution to pass, one wonders why the fact that the vote is taken 
before, and separately from, the final approval is regarded by the DBR as 
lessening investor protection compared to a regime in which the board approves 
the RPT without the dominant shareholder’s vote. It is true that any classification 
of legal rules requires a minimum level of formalism, as a purely functionalist 
interpretation would pave the way to excessive subjectivity in the coding 
exercise,65 but taking positive approval by independent board members for 
granted, i.e. regarding it as an irrelevant step in the voting process, is no less a 
subjective and questionable interpretation than considering it the first step of a 
multi-staged decision.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 Cf. SIEMS (2011), at 120-1 (Djankov et al. methodology assumes that the same type of problem 
exists in all the jurisdictions considered, while this is far from obvious). 
64 More broadly, the DBR team’s thinking (as we understand it) is a distortion of the assumption 
that all required approvals have been obtained (the same assumption is made by DJANKOV et al. 
(2008), at 432). The assumption enables an unambiguous assessment of criteria such as those 
included in the director liability index (e.g., whether a shareholder plaintiff is able to hold Mr 
James liable for the damage the Buyer-Seller transaction causes to the company). The coding of 
these variables depends in fact on whether the transaction is carried out in breach of the applicable 
corporate rules, a possibility that the methodology rules out by making the assumption explicit. 
This being its function, the assumption includes the final approval by the CEO, the board, or 
shareholders, as the case may be (see DJANKOV et al. (2008), at 433: “Buyers enters into the 
transaction. All required approvals are obtained and all the required disclosures made”). The same 
prerequisite does not make much sense if referred to variables dealing with the procedure for 
approving the RPT, as it includes the variable to be measured (the final decision-making 
responsibility) in the assumptions.  
65 See Armour et al. (2009a), at 600-1 (suggesting to enlarge the set of relevant variables in order 
to reduce the risk that formalism prevails over functionalism). 
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Moreover, although the special committee vote is the default device 
according to the RPT Regulation, it may be opted-out in favour of a double-
majority quorum for board approval. This is telling in two respects. First, no 
functional difference exists between a system where the two decisions – one by 
the plenum and another by the majority of the independents – are merged into 
one, as is the case in the optional rule, and one in which they are taken in two 
different moments, as is the case with the default regime. Therefore, because no 
one would ever regard the double majority requirement as a preliminary 
authorization to be assumed away, the same should hold true for any functionally 
equivalent regulatory device.    
Second, the reason why requiring abstention by Mr James makes the 
regulatory environment more effective – and here we come to the fact that 
interested parties are allowed to vote – is that this may prevent the board from 
approving the resolution despite the dissenting votes by the majority of 
disinterested directors.66 Therefore, although interested directors may vote under 
the RPT Regulation, the preliminary independent directors’ binding advice (i.e., 
vote) reaches the same outcome and goes even further. Indeed, even where Mr 
James is not allowed to vote – and the methodology requires no more than that – 
he may exert a significant influence over the resolution thanks to his mere presence 
at the board meeting: the default device adopted by the RPT Regulation avoids this 
risk because conflicted directors cannot be members of the special committee.67 If 
compared with simple abstention by Mr James or other conflicted board members, 
the Italian procedure for deliberating RPTs ensures a higher level of protection also 
because, at the special committee stage, it rules out voting by directors that, while 
disinterested in the specific transaction, are not independent and are therefore less 
likely to disregard Mr James’s preferences when casting their vote. 
From a methodological standpoint, it is worth noting that disregarding the 
role of the special committee by assuming it away as any other preliminary 
authorization, as the evaluation team does, is acceptable only if one adopts an 
extremely formalistic approach when interpreting the applicable legislation. And 
even in that perspective, qualifying the committee’s approval as a normal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 Note that the the Djankov et al. paper requires, with respect to the general meeting approval, that 
“the transaction must be approved by disinterested shareholders” (DJANKOV et al. (2008), at 434), 
not that interested shareholders are not allowed to cast their vote. This formulation of the variable 
– albeit referred to general meetings – better reflects the function of rules that prevent conflicting 
interests from determining the outcome of decisional processes. Mandatory abstention is the most 
straightforward, but not the only rule ensuring such a result.   
67 This being the reason why the double-majority voting is conceived of as a second best solution 
which requires an explicit choice by the company when the internal procedures are drafted.	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authorization may be questionable. Apparently, formalism is adopted with a view 
to ensuring that the evaluation is consistent across different jurisdictions. 
However, relying on formalism to ensure consistency and objectivity can lead to 
mistaken conclusions. First, we have shown that formal qualifications – such as 
classifying independent directors’ vote as a preliminary authorization rather than 
as part of a multi-staged board decision – are themselves arbitrary: arbitrariness 
and objectivity are hard to match. Second, by focussing on the qualification of 
procedural steps rather than on the role they perform, current coding practices risk 
disregarding essential corporate governance features and misjudging the rules’ 
effectiveness in terms of investor protection.68  
On the contrary, our analysis confirms that a functional approach69 would 
make the DBR assessment more accurate,70 on the assumption – which is not 
debated here – that the trust in benchmarking exercises as an instrument for 
fostering adequate legal reforms is well-placed.71 A comparative law study, if 
properly conducted, would indeed refrain from easily stating that a jurisdiction 
lacks a specific legal tool just because the formal rule which is sought for cannot 
be found. Rather, it would strive to look for alternative rules that, although 
formally different from the yardstick adopted as a basis for comparison, perform 
the same role.72 Other legal tools are at least as effective as mandatory abstention 
from voting in blocking a detrimental RPT,73 because they operate before the 
transaction is brought to the plenary session of the board and, at the same time, do 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 The approach followed by the DBR team when evaluating the Italian jurisdiction is not isolated. 
A similar (and symmetric) example is the maximum score (3; see supra, fn. 61) granted to France 
as a consequence of the provision (art. L225-40 Code de commerce) that enables shareholders to 
vote on RPTs authorized by the board of directors (IFC (2014e), at 65). First, the evaluation 
apparently disregards the fact that shareholder approval is required after the contract is entered 
into, and therefore does not represent a precondition for the transaction to be passed (see COZIAN 
et al. (2012), at 352; see also ENRIQUES et al. (2009), at 168). Second, the transaction is valid even 
in case shareholder approval is refused (OECD, Related Party Transactions, cit., at 64), although 
the directors who approved it may be liable for damages (Art. L225-41 and L225-42 code de 
commerce; LE CANNU & DONDERO (2013), at 500).       
69 See e.g. ZWEIGERT & KÖTZ (1998), at 32-47.     
70 See MICHAELS (2009); MICHAELS (2011) (suggesting stronger integration between comparative 
economics and comparative law); KERHUEL & FAUVARQUE-COSSON (2009), at 828 (same). See 
also MÉNARD & DU MARAIS (2008), at 76-7 (DBR neglects basic rules for an effective 
comparative study). 
71 We do not therefore enter the discussion on the nature and the merits of functionalism, a concept 
whose implications for comparative law are still highly debated (for an overview MICHAELS 
(2008). Rather, it is the DBR’s approach itself that compares different jurisdictions with the 
purpose of evaluating their relative efficiency (see id., at 373-6); a proper application of the 
functional method, as opposed to formalism, would be more consistent with the DBR’s 
assumptions. 
72 REITZ (1998), at 621 (on comparative law methodology).  
73 REITZ (1998), at 623 (each jurisdiction may conform in different ways to the ideal legal tool 
adopted as a term of comparison). 
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not depend on (non-conflicted but) non-independent members’ vote. Since these 
other tools may perform better than conflicted members’ abstention with no 
additional costs, the evaluation should reflect this state of facts. According to 
Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötz, 
“[t]he question to which any comparative study is devoted must be posed in 
purely functional terms; the problem must be stated without any reference to 
the concepts of one’s own legal system. Thus instead of asking, ‘What formal 
requirements are there for sales contracts in foreign law?’ it is better to ask, 
‘How does foreign law protect parties from surprise, or from being held to an 
agreement not seriously intended?’”74 
Comparative legal studies therefore necessarily entail some degree of 
generalisation, as the search for rules performing equivalent functions requires 
that formal definitions are abandoned in favour of broader categories capable of 
including different rules achieving the same normative result.75 By inspecting 
which formalities are required to approve the conflicted transaction, the DBR 
methodology assumes that board approval without Mr James’s vote is the second 
most effective governance device (after minority shareholder approval) in 
ensuring fairness. However, it falls short of asking the correct question: “does the 
relevant jurisdiction protect external investors by shielding the approval of the 
transaction from Mr James’s conflicted interest, i.e. by ensuring that the 
transaction is not passed if disinterested board members do not agree?” This 
question emphasize the result of the legal tool (sterilization of Mr James’s 
interests in board decision), rather than the formal features thereof (Mr James’s 
abstention, double majority, preliminary vote by disinterested members, or other 
devices). 
 
7. The impact of miscoding  
It is mainly in the dynamic evolution of applicable legislation that one can 
see how indicators deploy their influence on national policies.76 The DBR 
provides a diachronic perspective on legal reforms because year-on-year changes 
highlight whether a country is committed to improve its regulatory environment.77 
Flat performances or lost ground in the rankings may indicate that policymakers 
are not paying attention to areas of law that are key to boosting economic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 ZWEIGERT & KÖTZ (1998), at 34. 
75 REITZ (1998), at 625 (“comparative analysis […] forces the comparatist to articulate broader 
categories to accommodate terms that are […] functional equivalents”). 
76 DAVIS et al. (2012), at 11 (on indicators as “technologies” of governance). 
77 Historical data are also useful to test the relative attractiveness of a country over time, thus 
removing the influence of transient conditions on rankings (see ARMOUR et al. (2009b), at 350-3).  
21 
	  
growth.78 The DBR’s focus on trends in regulatory reforms therefore provides 
interested stakeholders with valuable information, as it allows comparisons (not 
only among different countries, but also) among different evolutionary stages 
within the same jurisdiction. 
In this respect, assigning an erroneously high score to a country in a 
certain year may paradoxically entail an underestimation of subsequent reforms, 
thus conveying the wrong idea that there has been no evolution in a jurisdiction 
even in circumstances where substantial improvements have been achieved. Once 
more, Italy provides some good examples, because two variables within the PII 
were wrongly coded prior to the RPT Regulation’s enactment.  
The first miscoding was about whether self-dealing transactions such as 
the one hypothesized in the DBR had to be disclosed in the annual accounts: the 
DBRs preceding 2012 assigned a 2 score (that is: “disclosure on both the terms 
and Mr James’s conflict of interest is required”79). This means that respondents to 
the questionnaire had stated that the transaction should indeed have been 
disclosed in detail in annual accounts.80 However, while before the RPT 
Regulation the law generically required companies to provide disclosure on the 
relations with their controlled, affiliated and controlling entities as well as with 
other entities under common control, the provision was predominantly held not to 
require detailed disclosure of individual self-dealing transactions,81 and such has 
been companies’ consistent accounting practice even after implementation of 
IFRS.82 It is only with the RPT regulation that a specific requirement has been 
introduced that the annual (as well as the half-yearly83) financial reports point out 
and describe each individual related party transaction falling above the materiality 
threshold.84 Before the regulation was enacted, 0 would have been appropriate. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 Of course, this would just be a rebuttable presumption, so to speak, because a country may be 
even more committed to reforms than others higher in DBR rankings, and just choose to do it “its 
own way.” 
79 Within this variable, a score of 1 is assigned if disclosure on the terms of the transaction is 
mandated, but not on Mr James’s conflict of interests; 0 is assigned otherwise. 
80 A similar mistake affects the Djankov et al. paper’s coding: see ENRIQUES (2009), at 503-4. 
81 See COLOMBO (1994), at 157.  
82 See IAS 24, § 18 (allowing the aggregation of related party transactions provided that a 
distinction among categories of transactions is given). See also OIC (2007), at 140. Companies 
used to aggregate related party transactions in their annual reports before the RPT Regulation 
entered into force (see CONSOB (2008), at 38). 
83 For interim financial reports, Art. 4 directive 2007/14/EC, implementing Art. 5(4) directive 
2004/109/EC (transparency directive), requires information on individual transactions that have 
taken place in the first six months of the financial year to the extent that they have materially 
affected the financial position or the performance of the enterprise during that period, as well as 
major developments thereof. 
84 See Art. 5(8) RPT Regulation (listed companies shall provide information, in the interim and 
annual reports, on each material transaction entered into during the reporting period). 
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In the same vein, before 2012 DBRs assigned a score of 2 for the variable 
“Whether immediate disclosure of the transaction to the public and/or 
shareholders is required?”.85 Before the RPT Regulation entered into force, a 
mandate for immediate disclosure of RPTs would either derive from the general 
rule requiring ongoing disclosure of price sensitive information86 or from a 
Consob rule requiring ad hoc disclosure for certain RPT (Art. 71-II Issuer 
Regulation, in place between 2001 and 2010). A transaction like Buyer’s would 
be very likely to fall within the scope of the ongoing disclosure obligations,87 so 
that the proper rating would have been 1 (as no disclose of Mr James’s conflict of 
interest was explicitly mandated). As for Art. 71-II of Consob Issuer Regulation, 
the conditions to be met for an obligation to disclose to arise were so hazy that 
very few transactions had been made public under the rule. More specifically, 
only transactions jeopardizing an issuer’s financial stability or financial account’s 
reliability – according to issuers’ own judgment – had to be disclosed. Because no 
such assumption is made in the case study, one cannot assume that Mr James’s 
transaction had to be disclosed pursuant to Art. 71-II. By contrast, under the RPT 
Regulation in force since 2011,88 companies are required to specify, in the 
releases they publish when disseminating price sensitive information, that a 
conflict of interests exists as a consequence of the relationship with the other party 
of the transaction.89  
Once the coding corrections suggested above are considered, the 
misleading impression that nothing relevant has been done in recent years fades 
away. Table 1 and Figure 1 below display the DBR coding with the adjustments 
we deem appropriate.90  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 Within this variable, a score of 1 is assigned if disclosure on the terms of the transaction is 
mandated, but not on Mr James’s conflict of interests; 0 is assigned otherwise. 
86 See supra fn. 47. 
87 See supra fn. 47.	  
88 See Art. 6(1)(a). 
89 Furthermore, listed companies shall issue, within seven days of the approval, an information 
document whose contents are set by the Regulation itself and encompass all the features of the 
transaction as well as a detailed disclosure of James’s interests (text accompanying fn. 49; see Art. 
5(1) and (3); see also Annex 4 to the Regulation). Although such information is more detailed than 
that provided for under Art. 6(1)(a) (see text accompanying fn. 88), it goes far beyond what is 
necessary to reach a score of 2 for the variable “Whether immediate disclosure of the transaction 
to the public and/or shareholders is required?”. We therefore leave it aside because the 
questionnaire sent to local experts – although the methodology is silent on the point – focuses only 
on disclosure to be performed within 72 hours after the transaction is approved (see supra fn. 49).     
90 In order to account for the overall impact of miscoding by the DBR, Table 1 and Figure 1 report 
all mistakes we identified, whether attributable to basic misunderstandings of the applicable rules 
(as explained in part 7) or to an unduly formalistic interpretation of the regulatory framework (as 
explained in part 6).  
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Table 1 
 Extent of Disclosure Index (Sub-Variables) 2011 Adj. 2012 on 
Adj. 
1 What corporate body provides legally sufficient approval 
for the transaction? 
1 2* 
2 Whether disclosure of the conflict of interest by Mr James 
to the board of directors is required? 
2 2 
3 Whether immediate disclosure of the transaction to the 
public and/or shareholders is required? 
1** 2 
4 Whether disclosure of the transaction in published periodic 
filings (annual reports) is required? 
0** 2 
5 Whether an external body must review the terms of the 
transaction before it takes place? 
0 0 
 Extent of Disclosure Index 4 8 
* The variable is adjusted to reflect the role of the binding opinion by the independent 
directors’ committee (see parts 5 and 6). 
** The variables are adjusted to reflect the situation prior to the full RPT Regulation’s entry into 
force (January 2011), where no explicit duty to immediately disclose Mr James’s conflict of 
interest was provided for and no ad hoc disclosure was mandated in the annual accounts. 
 
Figure 1   
 
Graphic: adjusted rankings for Italy (Extent of Disclosure Index) 
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By the same token, Tables 2 to 5 and Figure 2 show that Italy would have 
ranked much worse in 2011 (93rd instead of 59th), and would have held a much 
better position in the first year in which the Regulation was to be considered 
(2012) (29th instead of 65th), as well as in the last available survey at the time we 
are writing (2014: 32nd instead of 49th). 
Table 2 
 2011 Original 2011 DBR Corr. 2011 Adj.** 
Protecting 
Investors (rank) 
59th 44th   93rd  
Extent of 
disclosure index 
7 7 4 
Extent of director 
liability index 
4 4 4 
Ease of shareholder 
suits index 
6 7* 7 
Strength of investor 
protection index 
5.7 6 5 
 
Table 3 
 2012 2012 DBR Corr. 2012 Adj.** 
Protecting 
Investors (rank) 65
th 46th 29th 
Extent of disclosure 
index 
7 7 8 
Extent of director 
liability index 
4 4 4 
Ease of shareholder 
suits index 
6 7* 7 
Strength of investor 
protection index 5.7 6 6.3 
 
Table 4 
 2013 2013 Adj.** 
Protecting 
Investors (rank) 
49th 32nd 
Extent of disclosure 
index 
7 8 
Extent of director 
liability index 
4 4 
Ease of shareholder 
suits index 
7 7 
Strength of investor 
protection index 
6 6.3 
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Table 5 
 2014 2014 Adj.** 
Protecting 
Investors (rank) 52
nd 34th 
Extent of disclosure 
index 
7 8 
Extent of director 
liability index 
4 4 
Ease of shareholder 
suits index 
7 7 
Strength of investor 
protection index 
6 6.3 
* In Tables 2 and 3, in the “[year] Corr.” column, the variable “Ease of shareholder suits 
index” is 7 – instead of 6 – so as to reflect the appropriate coding of the variable 
“Whether the level of proof required for civil suits is lower than that of criminal cases?” 
as subsequently rectified by the DB team (see text accompanying fn. 34). 
** In Tables 2-5, the “[year] Adj.” column displays the appropriate coding in light of our 
analysis. 
 
Figure 2 
 
Graphic: adjusted rankings for Italy (Protecting Investors Index) 
 
Therefore, while no improvement and a relative loss in competitiveness 
emerge if one compares years up to 2011, on the one hand, and years since 2012, 
on the other, the adjusted variables highlight that Italy has actually gained 59 
positions as of 2014 in comparison with 2011. Inaccuracies of the DBR are 
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summarised in Table 6, which measures their impact on the ranking of Italy in 
2011 and 2014. 
 
Table 6  
Investor protection Index Original 
Ranking (1) 
DBR Corr. 
Ranking (2) 
Adj. Ranking 
(3) 
Δ 
(3) – (1) 
Δ 
(3) – (2) 
2011 59 (5.7) 44 (6) 93 (5) - 34 - 49 
2014 n.a. 52 (6) 34 (6.3) n.a. + 18 
Variation (positions) n.a. - 8 + 59 n.a. + 67 
 
 
 
8. Conclusions: Functional approach and transparent assessment 
The DBR has provided developing and developed countries with 
incentives to adopt more effective economic regulation, persuading policymakers 
that sound rules may enhance competitiveness and that cutting back on regulatory 
costs and redtape are ingredients for growth.91 Accuracy in the preparation of 
rankings is however essential to avoid that inadequate assessments convey 
distorted incentives to local reformers. Our analysis reports some coding errors 
that affect or have affected DBR’s assessment of Italy’s investor protection 
regime. Some mistakes are simply the result of erroneous readings of the 
applicable rules, as is the case for the scoring on the mandatory individual RPTs 
disclosure in the annual accounts (part 7). Others, such as the one still affecting 
the identification of the body providing legally sufficient approval for the 
transaction, are instead methodological, as they underestimate the fact that the 
procedural guarantees set forth by Consob RPT Regulation are, as a matter of fact, 
more effective than it would be by simply sticking to the relevant DBR variables 
on board approval (part 6). 
No ranking system can be perfect, as any measurement of law is prone to 
simplifications that are needed to perform quantitative evaluations.92 However, 
some strategies may be adopted with a view to ameliorating the accuracy of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 See e.g. MÉNARD & DU MARAIS (2008), at 67 (notwithstanding their imperfection, DBRs have 
the merit of having put high on the agenda the analysis of institutions as a key factor for 
understanding development and growth); IEG (2008), at 44 (same). 
92 See SIEMS (2005), at 529. 
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DBR assessment, and the magnitude of the shortcomings affecting the evaluation 
of the Italian legal framework for RPTs transactions confirms that there is room 
for improving the coding process leading to the formulation of indicators. 
Although the DBR assessment is already aligned with some best practices for 
scoring exercises (e.g., publication is made of the identity of the experts providing 
the first set of information concerning the relevant national provisions93), its 
transparency is still incomplete when it comes to justifying coding decisions that 
are not entirely straightforward.94  
Furthermore, an external review of the decisions made by the DBR team 
might enhance the reliability of the rankings, as this would reduce the risk that 
institutional inertia and confirmation biases affect the accuracy of the final 
indicators even in cases where the outcome of the process is prone to clerical, 
rather than methodological, errors.95 
Besides making the coding process subject to review and explaining 
borderline cases in the national reports, the methodology should always follow a 
more functional approach. Focusing on the results brought about by the rule under 
scrutiny, rather than on its formal features, could in fact substantially reduce the 
drawbacks we highlight. In particular, such an approach would bring at least two 
improvements. First, it would ensure that a more accurate knowledge of the 
societal context of different countries is obtained before rankings are attributed.96 
The combination of the rules under scrutiny with other legal and economic 
features of the concerned jurisdictions may deliver results that the current 
methodology does not catch, as it relies on the analysis of a stylised set of rules 
and is therefore prone to simplifications needed to perform statistical analysis.97  
Second, any set of regulatory standards will unlikely include all the rules a 
jurisdiction can resort to with a view to protecting investors, as a complete list of 
such legal tools would be difficult to collect and, in any case, to handle. In this 
scenario, functionalism can improve the quality of the assessment by avoiding the 
risk of circularity to which formalism is prone, as this latter relies on the 
assumption that only a specific set of legal devices can provide effective investor 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 Other organizations providing indicators are not equally transparent: for a sample review see 
DUTTA (2012), at 449-50. 
94 See also Independent Panel Review, cit., at 5 (suggesting publication of contributors’ 
submissions so as to allow external users to gauge the level of uncertainty associated to each 
index). 
95 See DUTTA (2012), at 440. According to INDEPENDENT PANEL (2013), at 5 and 29-30, miscoding 
might be more easily avoided if risk-mitigation devices, such as external reviews, were included in 
the assessment process. 
96 On the epistemic role of a functional approach see MICHAELS (2011), at 3-4. 
97 On statistical reductionism see id., at 12. 
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protection, and therefore disregards possible alternatives not included in the 
grid.98  
As a consequence of the DBR methodology, countries wishing to reform 
their regulation on investor protection may be incentivised to adopt a box-ticking 
approach and hence to pass legislations which mirror the DBR evaluation grid 
even when this brings no relevant benefit to investors. For instance, Italy would 
gain a number of positions in the PII ranking by amending a small number of 
legal provisions in ways that would not substantially add to the current level of 
minority protection. First, Mr James’s abstention might be mandated, with very 
little improvement, if any, from the point of view of his ability to influence the 
company’s decision, as we have shown. Second, as long as the DBR focuses on 
default rules,99 Italy’s performance would further improve if the law provided for 
shareholder approval of the transaction, while granting companies the possibility 
to opt-out and to grant independent directors a veto power, as is the case today.100 
Once more, it is far from certain that this would strengthen investor protection, as 
controlling shareholders could easily pass the charter amendments that may be 
required to deviate from the default rule. Third, as Consob RPT Regulation allows 
independent directors to appoint an external adviser of their choice but does not 
mandate it,101 imposing fairness opinions would boost Italy’s performance.102 
However, the reliability of outside experts appointed by the board is often 
questioned by legal and economics literature,103 which has therefore advised 
against mandating their appointment.104 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 An underlying home bias may explain the selection bias, as a consequence of the natural 
tendency for those involved in the preparation of the assessment grid to prioritise legal solutions in 
place in the jurisdictions of origin (see references at fn. 31).  
99 See supra, fn. 61 and accompanying text. 
100 A similar solution would be ruled out, though, if the EU Commission’s proposal on the 
approval by general meeting of significant related party transactions were adopted (see supra, fn. 
44). In the proposal, shareholder vote is mandated with no possibility of opt-outing.   
101 See text accompanying fn. 41. 
102 See Table 1, line 5.  
103 See e.g. MACEY (2013), at 621 (fairness opinions are aimed at providing protection against 
litigation risk rather than conveying useful information to directors and investors; external experts 
have an incentive to deliver opinions aligned with the results preferred by the company’s board); 
KISGEN et al. (2009) (fining evidence that fairness opinions in M&A transactions provide little 
value to shareholders of target firms, while results are mixed for acquiring firms’ shareholders); 
CLEVELAND (2006) (reputational concerns provide weak constraints on investment bankers having 
an incentive to align their opinion with their clients’ whishes). 
104 MACEY (2013), at 622-3 (absent Delaware courts’ de facto mandate for fairness opinions, these 
would perform their function better); WALTON (2012), at 276-7 and 295 (when second opinions 
are deemed useful to convey relevant information to the market, companies are likely to 
spontaneously resort to them. When this is not the case because the external experts are prone to 
conflicts of interests, mandating a fairness opinion will unduly certify the transaction to the 
detriment of investors). 
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If the measures we hypothesize above were passed, Italy’s Extent of 
Disclosure Index could reach 10.105 The PII would subsequently jump to 7,106 and, 
ceteris paribus, Italy would rank 16th in the DBR for investor protection. As 
shown, this may come with no corresponding substantial improvement in terms of 
investor protection. 
The current methodology therefore incentivises convergence to a single set 
of legal devices and inevitably rules out idiosyncrasies or, at least, makes them 
harder to evaluate, thus discouraging the quest for new legal devices capable of 
ensuring the same level of investor protection at lower costs. In other words, 
homologation trumps experimentation.107 By contrast, a functional evaluation 
would increase flexibility and allow for trial and error,108 which is pivotal in the 
field of investor protection because tunneling may be carried out through different 
techniques over time, also depending on the relevant legal framework.109 Just like 
in a cops and robbers game, that requires a wide array of new legal strategies to be 
tested. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 A mandatory fairness opinion would add one point on the score of 7 currently assigned for the 
extent of disclosure index. Mandatory Mr James’s abstention would add another point, while 
shareholder involvement – a measure alternative to Mr James’s abstention – would add two points.  
106 PII is in fact the average of the Extent of Disclosure Index (which would increase to 10), the 
Extent of director liability index and the Ease of shareholder suit index (which would respectively 
remain 4 and 7). 
107 RIBSTEIN & KOBAYASHI (1996), at 140-1 (uniform laws determine a lower degree of 
experimentation). 
108 On the role of functionalism in the production of rules see MICHAELS (2011), at 4. 
INDEPENDENT PANEL (2013), at 23, suggests reviewing the Indexes periodically in order to reduce 
selection biases. 
109 ATANASOV et al. (2011) (analysing different tunneling techniques and anti-tunneling strategies, 
and claiming that there is no broad consensus on which rules are better suited to protect investors). 
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